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ABSTRACT
Rising health care costs are essentially rooted in a health care system based upon adverse economic
incentives, which encourage both providers and patients to act with little regard to costs. To
effectively control demand and utilization of health services, and thus costs, a health care system
should be structured to provide incentives which motivate all participants to seek cost-effective care.
This study examines the theory and reviews the influence of financial incentives upon patient demand
behavior. Utilization data from the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative (CRI) are analyzed in terms of the
CRI program incentive structures in order to draw conclusions regarding the influence of incentives
upon beneficiary demand behavior. Based upon the CRI analysis and descriptions of financial
incentive-based models of demand behavior as described in the literature, suggestions for DOD health
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND THE IMPETUS FOR REFORM
The U.S. health care system is in a state of crisis. As
health care spending continues its upward spiral, a growing
majority of Americans are becoming dissatisfied with the
system and demanding reforms in health care financing and
delivery. In a 1990 Los Angeles Times poll, nearly three-
quarters of the respondents favored a national comprehensive
reform plan, even if it meant an increase in their taxes [Ref.
l:p. 41].
In 1990, 12% of the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
was spent on health care. The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) projects that health care spending will represent 18% of
the nation's GDP by the year 2000 if significant policy
changes are not implemented [Ref. 2:p. 1].
While most economists do not advocate limiting health care
spending to a specific percentage cf the GDP, the rapid
increase is cause for concern for several reasons. The most
important reason is that this increased spending has not
improved health outcomes as currently measured. Quite simply,
overall health care costs have exceeded their value. Compared
to other industrialized countries, the U.S. spends a greater
1
proportion of its resources on health but does not appear to
have a healthier population [Ref. 2:p. 2].
Another reason for concern is that of opportunity cost.
As more of our economy is devoted to health care spending,
less resources are available for investment in other areas.
Not surprisingly, increasing health care costs are frequently
blamed for the decreasing competitiveness of U.S. industries
and sluggish recovery from the economic recession.
A third reason concerns the growing portion of the federal
budget dedicated to health spending. Medicare and Medicaid
are the fastest growing portions of the federal budget. If
significant reforms are not made in these programs, the CBO
estimates that federal health care spending will increase from
17.5% to 23.6% of the federal budget between 1993 and 1998
[Ref. 3:p. 2]. The resulting increase in federal borrowing
and the national debt would have a serious adverse impact upon
our economy.
As a result of these concerns, health care reform has
assumed an increasing urgency in our national economic and
political rhetoric.
B. THE DOD HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
1. MHSS Overview
The Department of Defense (DOD) Military Health
Services System (MHSS) is a complex health care delivery
system that serves two concurrent missions: operational
2
wartime readiness and peacetime delivery of health care
services.
The MHSS is funded hý, Congress as part of the National
Defense Authorization Art. In Fiscal Year 1993, expenditures
for the MHSS will represent almost 6% of the DOD budget and
will exceed $15 billion [Ref. 4:p. 122].
Although 8.5 million beneficiaries are eligible to
receive health care benefits in the MHSSI, it is estimated
that only 4.4 million actually do so [Ref. 5:p. 2). The
remainder are believed to be using Medicare or private
insurance.
The MHSS is typically defined as being composed of a
direct and indirect care system. The direct care system is
comprised of 148 hospitals, 554 medical clinics and 300 dental
clinics [Ref. 4:p. 122]. The indirect care system is
represented by CHAMPUS2 , which can be compared to a
traditional fee-for-service insurance plan. The MHSS also
operates several adjunct delivery systems such as NAVCARE and
PRIMUS, and is in the process of conducting a plethora of
managed care demonstration projects. Thus, as the MHSS
continues to evolve as an integrated health care delivery
system, the dichotomy of direct and indirect care systems is
increasingly outmoded.
'This figure represents those individuals enrolled in the
Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System (DEERS).
2Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
3
As of October 1991, medical resources and programming
responsibilities for all the military services were
consolidated into a unified Defense Health Program under the
leadership of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs, ASD(HA). This effort was designed to improve
coordination between the services and better manage the MHSS
medical mission (Ref. 4:p. 130).
2. Projections for Rising Costs
In spite of the Clinton Administration's proposed
drawdown of active duty forces to 1.4 million by 1997, the CBO
projects that peacetime mission health costs will increase 22%
between the years 1993 and 1998 (Ref. 5:p. 6]. This increase
is projected despite an overall seven percent decline in the
total number of beneficiaries, and is based on: an increase in
CHAMPUS use due to base closures, a seven percent per annum
inflation rate for health care, and an estimated nine percent
increase in the population of retirees and their dependents.
As a result of these increased cost projections, and
because the MHSS is an integral part of the national health
care system, DOD is also facing pressure for health care
reform.
C. RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS AND THE INFLUENCE OF INCENTIVES
There are many reasons for the soaring health care costs
that confront our nation and the MHSS. Commonly noted causes
of medical cost escalation include: expanded use of higher-
4
cost medical technologies, third-party payment systems,
increased utilization of services, and insufficient emphasis
on preventive care.
These problems are essentially rooted in a health care
system based upon bad economic incentives. That is, our
health care system actually sends signals, incentives, that
encourage individuals to act in a manner that is not
economically efficient. Inefficient providers are rewarded on
the same basis as efficient providers. Likewise, consumers
who receive care from "extravagant providers are reimbursed on
a similar basis as those who search out economical providers."
(Ref. 6:p. 424]
Since the problem of soaring costs apparently stems from
bad economic incentives, the solution appears to be "a
revamped health care system where the incentives motivate
everyone to pursue or provide cost-effective care." [Ref. 7:
p. 1] In response, DOD health care reform efforts are leaning
towards managed care networks and capitation-based resource
allocation designed to encourage and provide more appropriate
incentives for the MHSS to deliver health services in a more
efficient and effective manner.
3In DOD's capitation-based resource allocation (budgeting)
methodology, Commanders of MTFs would be responsible for providing
health services to a defined population for a fixed dollar amount
per beneficiary. ASD(HA) Memo 07 May 1993.
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D. INCENTIVES AND INITIATIVES WITHIN DOD
1. Historical Incentive Structures in DOD
As stated above, to truly revamp the economy,
efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system,
appropriate incentives should be implemented for both
providers and consumers of health care. Past approaches to
contain cost growth within DOD, such as budgetary limitations,
utilization review, and restrictions on capital expenditures,
focused mainly on providers. As in the national health care
system, reducing patient demand for care was not a major
strategy [Ref. 8:p. 879]. Utilization of services within the
Military Treatment Facility (MTF) was primarily controlled by
limiting access. Excess, unsatisfied demand was shifted to
CHAMPUS or outside the military health care system. Under
managed care and capitation budgeting, commanders of MTFs will
be responsible for providing a full spectrum of health
services within their accountable network (MTF, CHAMPUS,
Contract), so demand shifting will be a moot point. In this
regard, provider incentives will be brought into line with
program reform objectives. Therefore, economic incentives
which address patient demand will become a factor of increased
importance in controlling cost growth.
2. DOD Initiatives to Contain Cost Growth
The first and largest of DOD's initiatives to improve
health care delivery and contain costs was the CHAMPUS Reform
6
Initiative (CRI). The CRI demonstration project, in effect
since August 1988 in California and Hawaii, was a contractor-
managed effort designed to better integrate the management of
CHAMPUS and the MTFs. The stated goals of CRI were to improve
access to and quality of health care while controlling cost
growth. This is the only large-scale DOD managed care project
for which cost, utilization and beneficiary satisfaction data
are available and thus it will be analyzed in detail in this
study.
During the period 1989 to 1991, DOD initiated
Catchment Area Management (CAM) demonstrations at five sites.
These demonstrations will be completed in late 1993. In CAM,
local military commanders are responsible for managing all
military and civilian care provided to an enrolled population
residing in their catchment area4 . Cost control is obtained
by negotiating discounts with and hiring civilian providers to
increase MTF use. Preliminary results show that CAM has had
mixed success in lowering costs. Of note, is that total
demand for outpatient care has increased under CAM. [Ref. 5:
p. 19]
In 1992, the Army began the Gateway To Care (GTC)
Program at 13 sites. In GTC, the local military commander is
responsible for managing all military and civilian care
provided to beneficiaries residing in their catchment area.
4A catchment area is defined as that area within a 40-mile
radius of the MTF.
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This program uses a modified form of capitated budgeting based
on the total number of eligible beneficiaries residing in the
area. As in CAM, early results show mixed success with the
program. [Ref. 5:p. 19]
Also in 1992, DOD began the Coordinated Care (CCP) and
TRICARE programs, which like CAM and GTC, attempt to integrate
military and civilian care with the features of a managed care
network.
In October 1993, DOD will begin the Uniformed Services
Family Health Plan in 10 sites, an HMO-style plan5 in which
enrolles receive their total care from the HMO and are
prohibited from using the MTF or CHAMPUS [Ref. 9:p. 20).
In July 1993, the Defense Health Agency (DHA) approved
a tri-service, region-based lead agent concept for managing
and integrating a networked health care delivery system [Ref.
10).
Except for the CRI program, it is still too early to
evaluate the results and benefits of these other initiatives.
E. THE CRI DEMONSTRATION PROJECT
The CRI is a good candidate for studying the effects of
incentives on health care demand and utilization of services
within DOD, since it is DOD's oldest managed care model.
5 A Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) is a prepaid health
plan that provides a range of health services in return for fixed
premiums.
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Also, comparative demonstration and control site cost and
performance data are available for this program.
CRI is a contractor-managed health care delivery program
in which eligible MHSS beneficiaries are offered a choice of
three programs: an HMO option, a PPO6 option, and standard
CHAMPUS (indemnity fee-for-service option). The three options
provide the same basic benefit structure, with the HMO option
providing additional preventive care services. Cost-sharing
provisions also vary between the three options. Therefore,
these differences represent the varying incentive structures
of the CRI program.
As directed by Congress, an independent evaluation of the
CRI project was performed. The evaluation was conducted by
the RAND Corporation, which compared CRI utilization, costs
and beneficiary satisfaction in 11 matched CRI and non-CRI
areas. The data were collected for. the six-month period
preceding CRI (February - July 1988) and then for a subsequent
six-month period following CRI implementation (May - October
1990).
This study analyzes and compares the utilization data from
the two six-month periods with the program incentive
structures, in order to draw conclusions regarding the
influence of incentives upon beneficiary demand behavior.
6In a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), medical care
providers such as doctors and hospitals, either individually or in
groups, agree to provide an insurance plan or employer with
discounts on their services.
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F. RATIONALE FOR AND EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THE STUDY
This study is expected to result in a greater
understanding of the role of financial incentives in
influencing beneficiary demand behavior and thus overall
utilization of health services. Since demand behavior is
integral to cost containment, access and utilization of care,
the demand behavior patterns gleaned from this study will be
useful:
1. As DOD considers various health care reform proposals.
2. In the evaluation of other currently ongoing DOD-
operated managed care initiatives (e.g., CAM, GTC, CCP).
3. In evaluating the effectiveness of existing incentive
structures in the CHAMPUS and CRI programs.
4. In enhancing coordination between the contractor and DOD
for risk-shared programs (e.g., CRI) in which beneficiary
demand may freely occur in either system.
5. In evaluating potential contractors of alternative
health care delivery and network programs from the
standpoint of managed demand experience.
6. In decisions regarding mandatory enrollment and
capitation budgeting in managed care systems.
7. In designing incentive-based systems for use within
MTFs.
G. CONDUCT OF THE STUDY
The approach used in this study will be an evaluation of
existing CRI health care utilization data in terms of the
financial incentive-based models of demand behavior as
described in the literature. The CRI demand patterns will
10
also be analyzed in comparison to demand behavior results from
other managed care programs employing similar incentives.
Chapter II of this thesis will discuss the role of
incentives in competition-based models of health care reform.
It will also describe the effects of financial incentives on
demand behavior, and the impact of financial incentives on
demand as reported in several studies.
Chapter III will describe the CRI demonstration project,
benefit structures (incentives), data source methodology and
results.
Chapter IV will discuss the findings regarding the
influence of financial incentives on demand for care in the
CRI project. The findings will be discussed in terms of
overall demand for care and beneficiary satisfaction. The
potential use of incentives in DOD health care reform will
also be discussed.
Finally, the conclusions and recommendations will be
presented in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND
A. THE INCENTIVES-BASED APPROACH TO HEALTH CARE REFORM
1. Market Flaws and Directions for Health Care Reform
The U.S. health care market fails to operate in an
economically efficient manner for many reasons, including
informational asymmetry, product complexity, and concerns
about equity [Ref. ll:p. 13]. These distortions are
intensified by the blurred distinction between consumer and
supplier in the market place, where the consumer may be a
patient, provider, employer or insurer.
The most salient difference however, between the
health care market and other markets is that health care is
widely viewed as a right of all individuals, not as a service
to be economically rationed by the ability to pay. As a
result, moral and ethical dilemmas abound. Insurance rating
policies which practice adverse selection have increased the
number of uninsured persons, and are often viewed as morally
repugnant. Adverse selection refers to the process whereby
individuals with existing or newly diagnosed illnesses are
excluded from coverage.
Medical ethicists worry that the fiduciary
relationship between doctors and patients will be replaced by
an economic one in which physician gatekeepers respond
12
primarily to financial incentives [Ref. 12:p. 629]. Hence,
the quality and adequacy of health care services delivered,
especially to the poor and persons with marginal health plans,
would be questioned. Explicit attempts to ration health care,
such as that initiated by the Oregon state legislature for
Medicaid patients, are met with strong opposition.
In recognition of these concerns, health care reform
proposals have taken on two distinct approaches. One approach
emphasizes the need for regulatory controls on providers and
hospitals, as exemplified by the single-payer, Canadian-style
national health care system proposals. The other approach as
exemplified by the Jackson Hole plan [Ref. 13:p. 15] focuses
on economic incentives to reduce wasteful spending, and
emphasizes managed care delivery systems and consumer-choice
to encourage competition. Both approaches differ in their
concept of the health care market, whether it is a failed
market in need of substantial regulation, or whether it is an
ailing market that can be improved through competition.
As evidenced by rapidly rising health care costs,
regulatory actions of the past (e.g., prospective payment
systems for Medicare and Certificate of Need programs to
control capital expansions) have failed to contain cost
growth. This is so because these changes did not address the
root problem -- an adverse incentive structure which
encourages excessive utilization and cost growth and
interferes with market competition. Also, experiences with
13
national health care systems in other industrialized countries
show that government price and budget controls fail to
restrain demand and utilization, and commonly result in
explicit rationing of health care services [Ref. 14:pp. 12-
17].
Over the past decade, experiences in this country with
managed care have shown that while it is capable of reducing
health care costs substantially, managed care, operating alone
in a system based on adverse incentives, will not contain the
rise in health care expenditures [Ref. 15:p. 27).
Therefore, the most effective health reform proposals
are likely to be those that comprehensively attempt to correct
the flaws and perverse incentives in the market place, and
emphasize enhanced consumer involvement in the demand and
utilization of health resources.
2. The Role of Incentives
Many of the reasons cited for soaring health care
costs: 1) expanded use of high-cost medical technologies, 2)
third-party payment systems, 3) cost-shifting due to
uncompensated care, 4) increased utilization of services, 5)
insufficient emphasis on preventive care and 6) lack of
individual responsibility and purchasing power, are
essentially the result of perverse economic incentives.
Our medical culture reinforces use of the most
advanced technology, high patient expectations and recourse
14
through litigation if these expectations are not met [Ref.
16:p. 25323. An "arms-race" phenomena exists in medicine, in
which providers compete on the basis of quantity and quality
of services, rather than on medical outcomes and cost [Ref.
17:p. 223. Our health care system is not organized to improve
health outcomes, but rather to attract providers and enable
them to practice their specialty (Ref. 16:p. 2533). Fee-for-
service insurance plans reimburse providers for delivering
more care, regardless of the necessity or limited health
benefits to be gained. Finally, consumers are shielded from
the true costs of health care by third-party payers, tax
subsidies for employer-provided health coverage and lack of
information regarding the costs, alternatives to and
effectiveness of medical treatments. They therefore have
exceedingly high expectations of the health care system and
make "cost-unconscious" decisions.
Within the MHSS, health care has traditionally been
incrementally budgeted on the basis of level of resources
consumed and quantity of services delivered. Quantity of
services is used as a surrogate measure for quality of care
and access, rather than health outcome. As a result,
providers are incentivized to overutilize resources.
Patients also face incentives to overconsume as free
outpatient care is offered within the MTF, and limited cost
sharing is required for inpatient care and CHAMPUS use.
15
Not surprisingly, statistics show that non-active duty
military beneficiaries have higher than average utilization
rates for health care services as compared to the overall
population. When comparing days of hospital care per 1000
persons under the age of 65, these beneficiaries used 720 days
as compared to 535 days for the general population, a rate
approximately one-third higher (Ref. 5:p. 13]. In terms of
outpatient care, active duty dependents average seven visits
per year as compared to an average rate of five per year for
the civilian population (Ref. 18:p. 16]. It has also been
estimated that retirees and their dependents initiate 2.2
times as many visits in the MTF than in CHAMPUS due to the
availability of free care (Ref. 19:p. 12).
B. HEALTH CARE DEMAND AND MORAL HAZARD
1. The Derivation of Health Care Demand
Most Americans have excessively high expectations
regarding the range of benefits and technological advances
that the U.S. health care system should provide. These
expectations are often translated into consumer demand.
In the health care system there are important
distinctions between need, demand and utilization of health
care services. Need generally refers to the level of care
required to treat a medical condition. The concept of "need"
though, can be extremely variable, driven by medical, ethical,
social and political concerns (Ref. 20:p. 2]. Demand is often
16
generated by patient expectations. Utilization, however,
represents the actual amount of health care services
delivered, and is affected by patient demand, physician
practice patterns and community standards for medical care.
Factors which influence our demand for care include
changing public attitudes as to the value of medical care and
the acute care delivery model, the increasing dominance of
chronic conditions, and the impact of rising education levels
on the desire to more fully participate in medical care
decisions. As these demand factors become more prevalent, the
misfit between our existing health care financing and delivery
system which emphasizes technology-oriented, specialty-based
acute care, and the public desire for more primary, home-based
and long-term care services becomes more pronounced (Ref. 21:
p. 396].
Demand for health care, as described in the economics
literature, is often referred to as being "derived" from a
health production function, in which individuals maximize
their well being subject to income and other constraints (Ref.
22: p.382].
The economic model of household production of health
[Ref. 2 3 :p. 24] is useful in studying demand behavior
patterns, since it combines the effects of a behavior with the
economic and behavioral determinants of why and how
individuals engage in these behaviors. This type of
17
multidisciplinary approach is needed as a result of the
complexity of determinants affecting health care demand.
2. Moral Haxard
Moral hazard refers to "the tendency of people with
insurance to change their behavior in a way that leads to
larger claims against the insurance company." [Ref. 24:p. 167]
It is essentially an issue of economic efficiency, in which
insured persons seek more care and then increasing levels of
insurance, thus driving the cyclical nature of medical cost
inflation (Ref. 25:p. 8). In the context of health care,
moral hazard encompasses both health risk and financial risk.
In terms of health risk, moral hazard exists to the
extent to which an individual's behaviors or lifestyle
adversely affects their health status. Although health risk
is impacted by genetics and many environmental factors such as
housing, education, crime, drugs, and poverty, some personal
behaviors can be modified to improve health status and life
expectancy. The U.S. Center for Disease Control estimates
that 53% of premature deaths in this country are attributable
to lifestyle habits such as smoking, drug and alcohol abuse,
poor diet, lack of exercise and failure to use seatbelts [Ref.
26:p. 29]. In a study of 1991 Medicaid expenditures, it was
determined that 20% of Medicaid expenses were used in the
treatment of tobacco, drug and alcohol related conditions
[Ref. 27:p. A2]. In addition to the personal costs and costs
18
to insurers, the increased costs to society of behaviors such
as smoking, drinking and lack of exercise are well documented
[Ref. 28:p. 5].
Moral hazard also exists in the form of financial
risk, that is, the extent to which individuals overutilize
health care services since they do not fully bear the costs of
their extra health consumption. In simple economic terms,
their marginal cost is less than their marginal benefit of
receiving the extra services.
Incentive models suggest that individuals use the
expected utility theory to evaluate the costs and benefits of
altering their behavior (Ref. 29:p. 120]. Therefore, health
plan incentive structures which integrate financial and health
promotion and wellness incentives should be the most effective
in altering demand and utilization behavior.
C. USE OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO INFLUENCE DEMAND
There are several interrelated financial incentive
strategies that may be used to influence demand.
1. Cost Sharing
Cost sharing strategies involve the use of
deductibles, coinsurance (copayments) and benefit structures
(covered services) as financial incentives to alter demand
behavior. As insurers struggle with health care cost
escalation, cost sharing is becoming a more common feature of
U.S. health plans. Cost sharing deductibles of $100 to $500
19
per person and 20% coinsurance rates are typical in the
insurance industry [Ref. 30:p. 155).
Several studies, that will be described below, have
demonstrated that cost sharing incentives strongly affect
demand for health care services. This effect is somewhat
mitigated however, by the increasing use of supplemental
insurance coverage. A U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) survey revealed that 80% of Medicare
beneficiaries were reinsured against cost sharing by
supplemental policies [Ref. 31:p. 5).
Cost sharing is likely to make the market more
competitive, since consumers who bear more costs are more
sensitive to price differences among providers. This
phenomenon has been witnessed in the price competition among
suppliers of optical services, for which consumers have had to
bear some or all of the costs of these services.
An important consideration in the use of cost sharing
as an incentive to control demand is the impact of delay or
deferment of treatment upon health status and the costs
incurred in treating more serious conditions. As will be
discussed below in the review of studies on the impact of
financial incentives on demand, this effect has not been
encountered to any significant extent.
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2. Choice of Economical Nealth Plans
A related financial incentive strategy designed to
reduce excess utilization and cost and encourage market
competition, is to provide incentives for consumers to choose
among competing low-cost individual providers or economical
managed care health plans. Consumer shopping would intensify
price competition among providers and plans [Ref. 32:p. 35).
This strategy presupposes, however, that beneficiaries are
informed of the costs and quality of health plan alternatives
and can choose freely among competing alternatives. Further,
the beneficiaries themselves bear the increased costs of
selecting "high-option" plans or reap the benefits of
selecting lower cost plans. A version of health plan choice
exists in the CRI model, in which eligible beneficiaries can
choose among HMO and PPO-type options and standard CHAMPUS
(fee-for-service).
For this economical choice strategy to be effective,
the consumer would need price and performance data on health
care providers and plans in order to make a rational choice,
including such data as resource use, health outcomes and
patient satisfaction [Ref. 33:p. 113]. As studies described
below will show, enhanced economic incentives, such as greater
benefits, may be necessary for the consumer to choose lower-
priced plans which limit provider choice.
Also, given the current tax treatment of health plan
premiums, a consumers' incentive to select economical
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providers or plans may be limited. Changes to the tax
treatment of health benefits would provide added financial
incentive to consumers to make cost-conscious choices.
3. Tax Treatment of Health Benefits
The tax exclusion for employer-provided health care
plans is "one of the most regressive and inflationary
incentives in the current health system" [Ref. 33:p. 114].
This open-ended federal tax subsidy is regressive since it
provides greater benefit to high income taxpayers as a result
of their higher marginal tax rates.
The employer exclusion also provides one of the
largest tax preferences to employers since contributions are
deductible business expenses for income tax purposes and are
exempt from payroll taxes. The CBO has estimated that this
tax subsidy to employees and employers will cost the federal
government $46 Billion in lost revenue in Fiscal Year 1993
[Ref. 5:p. 32).
The tax treatment of health care plans is
inflationary, since it incentivizes the purchase of more
comprehensive policies. As discussed in the section on moral
hazard, increasingly insured persons tend to seek more care.
This fuels medical cost inflation. The tax subsidy of health
care plans also has an adverse impact upon job mobility, since
a change of jobs often results in loss of group coverage and
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potential problems with waiting periods and preexisting
condition clauses in new health plans (Ref. 34:
p. 2541].
In the past, legislative bills to limit health care
tax preferences have suggested imposing limits on the tax-free
premium that employers could contribute to a health plan and
requiring employers to offer a range of options [Ref. 6:p.
427). Other bills have simply suggested repealing the
exclusion for employer-provided health insurance premiums
[Ref. 35:p. 63].
These suggestions are consistent with the competitive
market incentives-based approach which encourages consumer
awareness of cost, choice and responsibility.
4. Integration of Cost Sharing, Choice and Tax Changes
Although the financial incentive strategies discussed
above were presented separately, they are all integrated in
the competitive market approach to health care reform. In
this approach the consumer is responsible and accountable for
their health care choices, and acts in a cost-conscious
manner. Incentive structures thereby promote this cost-
conscious behavior, and thus cost-conscious demand.
A major concern with financial incentive structures is
that they be designed to restrain excess demand, not impose
financial deterrents to needed health care services. This is
necessary to ensure that low-income and high-need users are
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adequately served and to prevent future costly episodes of
care.
D. STUDIES ON THE EFFECTS OF INCENTIVES ON DEMAND BEHAVIOR
1. The Health Insurance Experiment
In the Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) conducted by
the Rand Corporation from 1974 to 1979, 2,760 families were
randomly enrolled in 14 insurance plans with varying levels of
deductibles and copayments. The HIE examined episodes of
treatment, versus total costs, so that utilization of services
could be more reliably measured. The results indicated that
both coinsurance and deductibles had strong effects in
reducing the number of episodes of care, but the cost per
episode was reduced only slightly. Copayments, fees collected
at the point of service, however, has the greatest effect on
utilization.
As compared with families who had a 25% cost share,
families in the free care plan used 25% more outpatient care
and had a 25% higher probability of hospital admissions.
Compared to those with cost sharing, recipients of free care
used emergency department services 90% more often for non-
urgent diagnoses such as lacerations [Ref. 18:p. 91].
Using a simulation model to predict the effect of
deductibles upon demand, it was determined that deductibles in
the range of $50 to $500 would be very effective in
restraining mostly outpatient demand, but larger deductibles
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exceeding $1000 would have little effect on reducing excess
utilization [Ref. 36:p. 60].
In the HIE, patients were less likely to defer acute,
chronic and hospital episodes than dental and well-care
episodes, and the demand effects of the various cost sharing
provisions did not have an adverse effect on health status.
Nonetheless, the concern of delayed treatment and subsequent
increased health care costs could be applicable to low income
consumers who might defer preventive and well-care services.
2. The UMW Study
The United Mine Workers (UMW) study was a natural
experiment for which the effects of cost sharing on both
consumer and provider behavior were analyzed. In 1977, UMW
labor agreements resulted in the abandonment of free health
care and adoption of cost sharing provisions which included a
40% coinsurance rate and a $250 deductible.
Immediately following the implementation of cost
sharing, demand for physician visits decreased by 36%. The
Russelton Medical Group, which served the UMW, was severely
affected by the reduced demand and attempted to compensate for
this reduction by increasing the number of physician-initiated
visits, a phenomenon referred to as "churning" (Ref. 37:p.
89].
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3. Other Cost Sharing Studies
In addition to the HIE, other studies in the
literature also support the effect of cost sharing on demand.
In a natural experiment conducted at Stanford University in
1973, when patients were changed from full coverage to 25%
coinsurance, physician visits were reduced by 24%. Likewise,
in a Newhouse and Phelps econometric study based on household
surveys, hospital spending was reduced by 17% when coinsurance
was changed from 0 to 25% (Ref. 38:p. 13].
Studies in the HMO environment also show that even
modest copayments reduce demand. Cherkin et. al. noted that
an introduction of a $5 per visit copayment resulted in an 11%
and 3.3% decrease in primary care and specialty-care visits,
respectively [Ref. 37:p. 87]. The copayments had a much
greater effect on high users, and no decline in health status
was detected.
4. Health Plan Choice
In a study on health plan choice, Medicare
beneficiaries were surveyed and offered choices among
traditional fee-for-service Medicare and several fictitious
alternative health plans (AHP). The plans varied according to
benefits provided (e.g., catastrophic coverage, long-term care
and pharmacy), cost and provider choice. The survey research
was then used to establish a regression model for AHP plan
choice.
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The results were evaluated in terms of an expected
utility approach, and showed that demand was more responsive
to price changes than expected value of benefits [Ref. 39:p.
26]. Further, as provider choice became more limited,
respondents were less likely to enroll in an AHP unless
offered substantial financial incentives.
5. Family Use Demand Patterns in DOD
In 1984, DOD conducted a mail survey of military
beneficiaries for the purpose of garnering general opinions
about health care, family use and cost of care, and
satisfaction with care received. Data from the survey was
subsequently used to statistically model the probability of a
family choosing one of the following categories of outpatient
use: military-reliant, military-preference, civilian-reliant,
or civilian-preference.
Results of the model suggested that families would
alter their patterns of care in response to changes in the
cost or availability of care [Ref. 18:p. 103). Military
families weighed two costs in selecting their source of care,
the "time" or convenience cost of medical care and the out-of-
pocket cost of care. As expected, the closer a family lived
to a military treatment facility, the more likely they were to
be classified as military-reliant. Also, as income level
increased, the expected likelihood of civilian-reliant or
civilian-preference for care increased. In this model though,
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the "time" cost of care was only related to distance, and did
not include time spent waiting for service delivery.
6. Non-Monetary Factors in Health Care Demand
In a Rand study of public sector outpatient department
use, the "time" cost of travel was found to be an important
determinant in the demand for medical services when free care
was available (Ref. 40:p. 14]. The results showed that
estimated distance-elasticities approached or equaled the
effect of monetary price-elasticities on demand. They also
showed that the provision of free service could inadvertently
be shifted in favor of persons with a low opportunity cost of
time. This latter result raised the issue of using income
subsidies as a tool to redistribute the relative proportions
of care sought in the public and private sectors.
B. SUMMARY
This chapter has described the role of economic incentives
in shaping the behavior of health care consumers. When
consumers are shielded from the true costs of health care by
third-party insurance payers and tax subsidies for employer-
provided health coverage, they do not make cost-conscious
decisions regarding health care consumption, and contribute to
rising health care costs. Lack of information regarding the
costs, alternatives to and effectiveness of medical treatments
also contributes to uneconomic choices.
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The phenomenon of moral hazard, which refers to the
tendency of persons with insurance to change their behavior in
ways leading to larger insurance claims, was discussed in
terms of both health risk and financial risk. In terms of
health risk, moral hazard exists to the extent to which an
individuals behaviors or lifestyle adversely affects their
health status. In terms of financial risk, moral hazard
exists to the extent individuals overutilize health care
services since they do not fully bear the costs of their extra
health consumption.
Financial incentive strategies to influence demand are
thus aimed at making consumers more aware of the costs of
their lifestyle and health care choices. These strategies are
interrelated and include cost sharing, choice among economic
health plans, and modification of the tax treatment of health
benefits.
Several studies citing the effects of these incentives on
demand behavior were presented to illustrate the behavioral
changes that occur when consumers more directly bear the cost
and consequences of their health care choices.
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CURPTZR I1. METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
A. METNODOLOGY
I. The CRI Demonstration Project
The CHAMPUS Reform Initiative (CRI) was implemented in
August 1988 as a five-year managed care demonstration project
to control costs and improve access to and quality of care
provided to beneficiaries.
In the CRI project, beneficiaries were offered a
choice of three health care plan options:
1. Standard CHAMPUS, a fee-for-service reimbursement
program in which beneficiaries could seek care from a
network of providers participating in the CHAMPUS program.
2. CHAMPUS Prime, an HMO-type option in which enrolled
beneficiaries had reduced cost sharing and greater
preventive care coverage in exchange for their sole
participation in Prime.
3. CHAMPUS Extra, a PPO-type option in which beneficiaries
had reduced cost sharing if they used the optional PPO
network.
Appendix A lists the cost sharing and benefit
provisions of each of these options.
CRI was implemented as a contractor-operated program,
in which the contractor shared the financial risk with the
government of providing health care services to CHAMPUS
eligible beneficiaries. The CRI model is considered "risk-
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shared", since the contractor did not fully assume the
financial risk for providing all defined health care benefit
services to the eligible population. Although the contractor
carried the combined risk for both the open-ended fee-for-
service and managed care options, they were reimbursed by DOD
for this increased risk subject to certain limits on losses
and profit. The contractor and government also shared the
risk, in that beneficiaries within the CRI project area were
able to use both CRI and MTF services.
2. The Rand Evaluation
An independent evaluation of CRI was conducted by the
Rand Corporation to assess whether CRI achieved its goals and
to estimate the effects of CRI on utilization of services,
costs and beneficiary satisfaction.
The Rand evaluation essentially consisted of three
parts. The first of these focused on the relative change in
health care use by a sample of beneficiaries, since relatively
complete and accurate data could be derived for a sample
population. From this data, health care utilization and costs
"with CRI" and "without CRI" were estimated for the CRI
demonstration area. These estimates were based on data from
the demonstration and control sites, adjusted for preexisting
cost and utilization differences and differences in the
populations served.
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The second part of the Rand evaluation focused on
differences in aggregate health care use by all beneficiaries
within the CRI areas, to determine the effectiveness of CRI's
utilization review procedures. This approach, while useful in
measuring total CHAMPUS use, has limited utility in
comparative studies of health care demand, since an accurate
count of eligible beneficiaries does not exist and differences
in beneficiary health status and other characteristics can not
be adjusted for [Ref. 41:p. 2].
The third part of the evaluation, derived from a
survey of beneficiary attitudes, focused on access to and
satisfaction with health care services within both the CRI and
control areas.
Data for the Rand evaluation were obtained from
several sources: beneficiary surveys, MTF utilization and cost
data, and CHAMPUS claims. Cost measures included CHAMPUS
costs, MTF costs and total government costs for inpatient and
outpatient services. Utilization measures included the number
of outpatient visits and hospital days in CHAMPUS and the MTFs
[Ref. 41:p. 2).
The data was gathered from 11 matched CRI and control
sites during a baseline and follow-up period. The baseline
period, February through July 1988, immediately preceded the
implementation of CRI. The follow-up period occurred
approximately two years later, from May through October 1990.
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Once the raw data for the final sample population was
collected and adjustments were made for health status and
other differences, regression analyses were performed to
estimate the effects of CRI on utilization, costs and
beneficiary satisfaction within the entire CRI area. The
analyses also enabled estimation of what utilization, costs
and satisfaction would have been in California and Hawaii
without the CRI demonstration project.
A complete description of the selection of control and
demonstration sites, sample frame, survey questions and




This study utilizes the results of the Rand
evaluation in order to examine the effect of incentives upon
beneficiary demand behavior. The following assumptions,
described below, were incorporated in the study:
"* Outpatient utilization is used as the measure of demand.
"* The incentive structure is represented by the cost sharing
and benefit provisions of the three CHAMPUS options.
Health care utilization is a function of many
factors, including health status, technology, medical practice
patterns, effectiveness of utilization review, and demand.
While inpatient utilization is primarily provider-driven and
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subject to the extent of utilization review, outpatient
utilization is largely patient-initiated. Further, by
comparing utilization patterns of the same individuals over
time, the effect of health status factors is held constant.
Since the MTFs do not maintain automated
information on individual outpatient visits, this portion of
the outpatient utilization data was obtained by survey.
Although self-reported health care utilization data may be
subject to bias (e.g., older persons, heavier users of health
care and healthy individuals tend to underreport) previous
studies have noted that, on average, the reported number of
visits closely approximates the actual number of visits [Ref.
41:p. 18).
Many studies of demand behavior, such as those
described in Chapter II, frequently cite outpatient
utilization as a measure of demand. Therefore, outpatient
utilization, in the absence of a more universally recognized
surrogate, is used to measure demand.
The second assumption concerns the incentive
structure inherent within the CRI options. Factors which
influence demand for care include cost sharing provisions,
covered benefits or services, and "time" cost considerations
such as proximity and access to care. The benefit structures
of the three CRI options, as listed in Appendix A, encompass




In the CRI project, the Prime option offered the
incentives of reduced cost sharing and increased preventive
care benefits in exchange for mandatory enrollment in an HMO-
type health care delivery program. Once enrolled in Prime,
beneficiaries could not seek care through the other CRI
options. All beneficiaries not enrolled in Prime, however,
were free to use the Extra or standard CHAMPUS options at
their discretion. Thus, for evaluation purposes,
beneficiaries using the Extra or standard CHAMPUS options
essentially form one group (Non-Prime), since the extent of
incentives employed and differences in use of services between
these groups can not be distinguished. Therefore, comparisons
in this study are made between two CRI groups: Prime and Non-
Prime users.
The principal factor employed in this study to
evaluate the impact of incentives upon beneficiary demand
behavior is utilization of outpatient services. Demand
patterns, as evidenced by outpatient utilization rates, are
thus used to measure the effectiveness of the incentives
employed. The degree to which the incentives were implemented
is evaluated in terms of cost sharing changes and utilization
of the additional preventive health care benefits provided
under the Prime option. Beneficiary opinions regarding access
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to and satisfaction with care are also evaluated in order to
assess the impact of incentives upon the "time" cost of care.
Specifically, the following comparisons are made:
"* Outpatient utilization rates for Prime and Non-Prime
beneficiaries within the CRI area and estimates of
outpatient utilization in this same area had CRI not been
implement id.
"* Utilization of preventive care services for Prime, Non-
Prime and Control area beneficiaries.
"* Average out-of-pocket costs in the CRI and Control areas
during the two study periods.
"* Waiting times, travel times, satisfaction with out-of-
pocket costs, and satisfaction with access to care for
Prime, Non-Prime and Control area beneficiaries.
B. FINDINGS
The following tables present findings on the effects of
CRI on outpatient utilization rates, patient cost shares, and
access and satisfaction measures. The values represented are
predictions for the population as a whole derived from
regression analyses performed on the sample data. Due to
sample size limitations, separate comparisons for children
could not be made. Therefore, comparisons are made for the
adult population only.
1. Outpatient Utilization Rates
As indicated in Table 1, civilian health care
utilization rates for adults participating in the Prime
program were significantly higher than those for Non-Prime
beneficiaries. This finding is not surprising since the lower
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cost sharing provisions of the Prime program were likely to
result in an increased demand for care. Of interest, is that
even though Prime beneficiaries had higher utilization rates
of civilian care, their use of military health care was
approximately the same as that for Non-Prime users.
The findings also suggest that there was little
difference between the civilian health care utilization rates
of Non-Prime beneficiaries and utilization rates expected for
these same beneficiaries had CRI not been implemented, the
"Without CRI" estimates.
There was also some difference, though not
statistically significant at the .10 probability level, in the
utilization of military health care between the Non-Prime and
"Without CRI" groups. This difference is probably
attributable to the improved access to MTFs which may have
partly resulted from the resource sharing and CHAMPUS-MTF
coordination provisions of CRI.
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Table 1
Outpatient utilization Rates in CRI
ource of Care (Adults) Prime Non-Prizs without
CRI
civilian visits per beneficiary 2.12* 0.90 0.90
Percentage with visits 42%* 21% 22%
Visits per user 4.82** 3.93 3.80
Military visits per beneficiary 2.02 2.01 1.86
Percentage with visits 49% 50% 48%
Visits per user 3.88 3.76 3.54
Notes: * Difference statistically significant at the .01
probability level. ** Difference statistically significant at
the .05 probability level. The "Without CRI" estimates
represent utilization rates for the CRI demonstration
population under the assumption that CRI was not implemented.
Source: Hosek, S.D. and others, Evaluation of the CHAMPUS
Reform Initiative; Health Care Utilization and Costs, Vol. 3,
Rand Corporation, 1993, p.24.
2. Utilization of Preventive Care Services
Table 2 reflects differences in the utilization of
preventive care services for Prime, Non-Prime and Control
beneficiaries. Beneficiaries responded in the follow-up
period (May - October 1990) whether they had received these
services in the past year. Differences between actual use and
use based upon predicted utilization values from regression
techniques were then statistically compared between the Prime
and Control groups, and the Non-Prime and Control groups.
As shown in Table 2, a greater proportion of Prime
enrolles received preventive care services than Non-Prime and
Control beneficiaries. In fact, all differences between Prime
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and Control beneficiaries were statistically significant at
the .10 probability level or less.
Since increased preventive services was one of the
incentives for beneficiaries to enroll in Prime, and the cost
of these services was covered for Prime but not the Non-Prime
and Control beneficiaries, it is not surprising that Prime
enrolles had greater access to and use of these services.
The differences, however, between Non-Prime and
Control beneficiaries for each of these services was not
statistically significant at the .10 level. This could
indicate that Prime members increased use of these services




Percentage of Beneficiaries Recoiving
Preventive Care Services in the Past Year
CRI and Control Area Beneficiaries
Preventive Care Measure Prise Won-Prine Control
Blood Pressure Check 91.3* 85.4 85.0
Rectal Exam (Age > 40) 55.2** 46.4 47.2
Pap Smear (Women Age > 18) 74.5** 67.4 68.0
Breast Exam (Women Age > 18) 76.5* 67.8 68.3
Mammogram (Women Age 35-49) 78.3*** 72.5 70.9
Mammogram (Women Age > 50) 68.3** 57.4 54.2
Notes: * Difference statistically siicant at the *.01
probability level. ** Difference statistically significant at
the .05 probability level. *** Difference statistically
significant at the .10 probability level.
Source: Sloss, E.M. and Hosek, S.D., Evaluation of the
CHAMPUS Reform Initiative, Beneficiary Access and
Satisfaction, Vol. 2, Rand Corporation, 1993, p.27.
3. Cost Sharing Changes
Table 3 shows the changes in the average annual costs
paid by beneficiaries. As expected, the reduced cost sharing
provisions of CRI lowered out-of-pocket costs for both Prime
and Non-Prime beneficiaries, but to a much greater extent for
Prime participants.
The pre-demonstration costs were higher in California
and Hawaii than in the Control areas because CHAMPUS allowable
charges were higher. These higher costs were one of the
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reasons that the California/Hawaii region was selected as a
demonstration site for the CRI project.
During the post-demonstration period, the amounts paid
by active duty spouses in the Non-Prime group were slightly
lower ($8.00) than those paid in the Control area. For
retirees and spouses, Non-Prime beneficiaries had lower out-
of-pocket costs than those in the Control area, presumably as
a result of the increased access to MTF care afforded by CRI.
Out-of-pocket costs for active-duty spouses in the
Control areas were also lower ($14.50) in the post-
demonstration than in the pre-demonstration period. Since
health care costs did not decline between 1988 and 1990, this
difference could be attributable to fee discounts and lower
utilization levels experienced with CHAMPUS participating
providers. It is also possible, that since the data was
obtained from existing CHAMPUS claims records, that the claims
records for active-duty spouses in the Control area in the
post-demonstration period were not complete.
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Table 3
Average Annual Out-of-Pocket Cost Per Beneficiary
CRI vs. Control Areas
Category Pre-demo Post-demo Pre-demo Post-demoPrime Non-Prime
Active $171.71 $31.71 $90.30 $112.80 $98.30Duty
Spouses
Retireeas $386.19 $121.16 $296.76 $361.36 $358.42
andSpouses
Notes:Tae 4 Pre-demonstration pefi represents the baseline
period, February - July 1988. The Post-demonstration period
represents the follow-up period, May - October 1990. Tests of
statistical differences were not performed.
Source: Hosek, S.D. and others, Evaluation of the CHArPUSReform Initiative; Health Care Utilization and Costs, Vol. 3,
Rand Corporation, 1993, p.35.
4. Access and Satisfaction Measures
Table 4 reflects beneficiary opinions regarding their
satisfaction with costs, quality and access to civilian care
under the CHAMPUS and CRI programs.
Statistically significant differences exist between
Prime and Control group members primarily in the area of out-
of-pocket costs, suggesting that cost sharing was the most
influential incentive of the program. Differences in
satisfaction with time cost features, such as travel time and
office wait, between the Prime and Control groups were
negative. This could indicate that network providers were
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less conveniently located, or perhaps they had heavier
workloads as a result of increased scheduling to counteract
the effect of lower negotiated fees. It may also indicate an
increased expectation on the part of the Prime beneficiary,
who desired a decrease in "time" costs concomitant with that
of out-of-pocket cost, or simply reflect the expectations of
those beneficiaries utilizing civilian sources of care, rather
than MTF, for the first time.
Prime program retirees and their spouses reported
greater overall satisfaction with civilian care, specifically
with access to care. Since the Prime option significantly
lowered the financial barriers to access for these
beneficiaries, it is not surprising that its users perceived
greater satisfaction with and increased access to care.
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Table 4
Access and Satisfaction Measures
Percentage of Beneficiaries Satisfied with Civilian Care
CRI vs. Control Area Beneficiaries
Prime Non-Prime Control
overall Satisfaction
All aspects of care:
Active Duty Spouses 69.4 67.0 66.6
Retirees and Spouses 70.3** 65.7 63.9
Cost:
Active Duty Spouses 77.7* 60.5 56.6
Retirees and Spouses 81.2* 63.3 62.3
Access:
Active Duty Spouses 69.1 66.5 66.6
Retirees and Spouses 75.3* 68.8 67.9
.................................. * *. .* . .. . *. . * .. *. . ,.
Encounter-Specific Sat isf act ion ............ .......
Travel Time 83.9 88.9 86.6
Office Wait 81.6 84.7 83.8
Out-of-Pocket Cost 95.2* 76.2 74.1
Quality of Care 90.5 89.4 86.8
Note: * Difference between the Prime and Control groups
statistically significant at the .01 probability level.
** Difference between the Prime and Control groups
statistically significant at the .05 probability level.
Source: Sloss, E.M. and Hosek, S.D., Evaluation of the
CHAMPUS Reform Initiative, Beneficiary Access and
Satisfaction, Vol. 2, Rand Corporation, 1993, pp. 32-34.
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CEAPTER IV. DISCUSSION
A. BENEFICIARY INCENTIVES AND DEMAND EXPERIENCE IN CR1
The CRI demonstration project provided an extensive amount
of information to evaluate the effect of incentives on the
demand behavior of DOD beneficiaries. Incentives for the
managed care option of the CRI program included: reduced cost
sharing, added preventive services benefits, and elimination
of claims filing. These incentives were designed to entice
beneficiaries to enroll in the HMO-like Prime option. Prime
also offered beneficiaries the opportunity to reduce their
"time costs" through the choice of primary care providers, who
potentially could have been more conveniently located than the
MTFs.
The initial results of the CRI program indicate that these
incentives encouraged beneficiaries to increase their demand
for outpatient services. This finding is consistent with the
literature which suggests that reduced cost sharing to
individuals results in an increased demand for services. As
expected, Prime participants also increased their use of
preventive services, a finding consistent with studies of
managed care delivery programs.
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1. Reduced Cost Sharing and Increased Demand
The Prime option of the CRI program significantly
reduced out-of-pocket costs for beneficiaries. Pre-
demonstration out-of-pocket costs were $171.71 for active duty
spouses and $386.19 for retirees and spouses. Post-
demonstration out-of-pocket costs dropped to $31.71 and
$121.16 for these same beneficiaries. This significant
decrease largely reflects the low copayment of $5 required for
physician visits. As a result, Prime beneficiaries initiated
more of these visits as measured by the increase in outpatient
utilization.
During the six-month study period, Prime participants
averaged 2.12 civilian outpatient visits per beneficiary as
compared to 0.9 civilian outpatient visits per beneficiary for
Non-Prime beneficiaries. While a portion of this increase
could be attributed to the increased use of preventive
services and improved utilization management in the managed
care program (e.g., inpatient care was shifted to the
outpatient setting), these factors do not completely account
for the significant increase in outpatient utilization rates.
Also, since the data were adjusted for differences in health
status between the Prime and Non-Prime groups, it is assumed
that the remaining difference not attributable to enhanced
utilization management, the additional use of preventive
services or increase in provider-driven utilization represents
unnecessary demand. Unnecessary demand in this case is
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defined as demand initiated by the "worried well" or demand
for care that did not require physician services.
These findings suggest that the cost sharing
provisions of the Prime option were not sufficiently high to
restrain unnecessary demand by the beneficiaries. As the
studies in Chapter II demonstrated, financial incentives play
an important role in restraining excess or unnecessary demand.
And, of all the financial incentives employed, copayments, or
"nuisance fees" as they are sometimes called, provide the
strongest financial incentive to control demand.
Therefore, changes in the CRI program incentive
structure which increase the copayment could serve to restrain
unnecessary demand, and thereby reduce costs to DOD.
2. Enhanced Benefit Structure
Another incentive employed in the Prime option of the
CRI program was an enhanced benefit structure. As illustrated
in Appendix A, the Prime option included additional benefits
such as routine physical exams, pap smears and other similar
preventive care services. As expected, Prime beneficiaries
made statistically significant higher use of these services
than Non-Prime or Control area beneficiaries. While this
additional use likely contributed to the higher outpatient
utilization rates for Prime beneficiaries and increased costs
to DOD, this use should be perceived as a positive result of
the program.
47
An underlying objective of many managed care programs
is to promote health and enhance wellness. This is usually
accomplished by including generous preventive care benefits
and educational services in the benefit plan. While
recognizing that short term costs are increased in this
approach, it is assumed that long term financial benefits will
be realized through cost avoidance of treating chronic and
serious conditions.
While the data reflect an increase in the use of
preventive health services, it is unknown whether this
availability and use of services led to the adoption of
healthier lifestyle behaviors and choices on the part of Prime
participants. Studies in the literature, however, do suggest
that the more aware a patient is of the relationship between
their lifestyle choices and health status, the more likely
they are to engage in healthy behaviors. So, if patients also
responded to the incentive structure with changes in their
lifestyle behaviors, DOD would realize future financial
benefits as well.
Therefore, in spite of structural features of the DOD
budget system which focus on current fiscal year spending and
cost control, DOD should emphasize preventive care for both
active and non-active duty beneficiaries. As long as the
entitlement nature of the health care services for DOD
beneficiaries continues, DOD will benefit from these long term
savings. This is because beneficiaries now served by the MHSS
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will also be our future beneficiaries. Also, as DOD
transitions to a budgeting system based upon capitation
financing, it will be easier to justify the expense of
preventive services in the short term.
In summary, the increased use of preventive services
by Prime beneficiaries should be viewed as a positive outcome
of the program. These benefits should continue to be included
in the program benefit structure.
3. Time Cost
The results of the CRI program indicated that Prime
participants were actually less satisfied with travel time and
office waits for civilian care than Non-Prime and Control area
beneficiaries. This finding indicates that the "time cost"
incentive was not internalized by beneficiaries, perhaps due
to the location or insufficiency of the number of
participating network providers. If, with the maturation of
the contract, the location and number of participating
providers were improved, it is assumed that the "time cost"
incentive would be more influential and beneficiaries would
demand even more care. This result would of course be to the
detriment of government cost control efforts.
Another incentive impacting the "time cost" of care
was the reduced paperwork feature, the elimination of claims
filing, of the Prime option. Since specific data regarding
satisfaction with this feature were not gathered, its impact
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on demand can only be inferred. As studies in the literature
suggest, incentives which reduce the "time cost" of care may
serve to increase demand, albeit at a much lower extent than
incentives addressing cost sharing. Therefore, it is assumed
that the elimination of claims filing may have been an
influential incentive in reducing the "time cost" to
beneficiaries and may partially explain a portion of the
increase in outpatient demand and utilization.
4. Evaluating the Demand Experience in CRI
An important question in evaluating the results of the
CRI program, is whether the increased demand was anticipated
by DOD and whether this was a desired result of the
demonstration program. As stated in Chapter III, DOD's goals
for the program were to control costs and improve access to
and quality of care provided to beneficiaries. In terms of
these goals, DOD had mixed success with the demonstration
project. Perceptions of access, satisfaction and quality
improved, while total costs to DOD increased above those in
control areas.
Based on the experiences of other managed care
programs, it was assumed that slight increases in demand for
outpatient services would be more than offset by savings from
increased use of the MTF's and intense utilization management
of inpatient services. This did not occur. While significant
cost decreases were noted for inpatient utilization, they were
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not enough to offset large cost increases from unrestrained
outpatient demand and the administrative costs of the program
[Ref. 41:p. 45). Therefore, it can be concluded that the
marked increase in outpatient utilization was not an
anticipated nor desired outcome of the demonstration project.
Several studies undertaken before the CRI began
foreshadowed these potential problems [Ref. 18:p. 44], [Ref.
43:p. 13), and [Ref. 44:p. 29). These studies reviewed the
CRI program and benefit incentive structures and concluded
that costs to DOD could rise as a result of increased
utilization of outpatient services and the risk assumed by DOD
in the implementation of a shared-risk contract.
Thus, there were flaws in the incentive structure of
the original CRI model. Cost sharing provisions were not set
at a level sufficient to restrain unnecessary demand. The
model also did not require enrolled beneficiaries to obtain
all their care through the Prime network, essentially allowing
open access to the MTF's. This feature provided an incentive
to beneficiaries to supplement their network health services
with free or low cost MTF services, thereby severely limiting
utilization management efforts. This shared-risk provision of
the model exposed DOD to the added risk of increased costs,
which could have been minimized with a fully at-risk,
capitated contract.
The successor contract to continue the CRI
demonstration program in California and Hawaii beyond February
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1994 does not include changes regarding the availability of
MTF services to Prime participants or risk sharing with the
contractor. However, while it does maintain all the same cost
sharing features in the initial option period of the contract,
it does allow for adjustment by DOD of the copayment levels in
future option periods.
Therefore, it is likely that the same patterns of
increased demand and utilization will occur in the early
period of the successor contract and that costs to DOD will
again be higher than those in non-CRI areas. These cost
increases are likely to be exacerbated by the higher
enrollment rates of beneficiaries in the Prime option. In
1993, Prime enrollment had at least doubled since the 1990
study data was collected [Ref. 41:p. 37].
If copayments were increased in future option periods
of the successor contract, to perhaps $10 or $15, it is likely
that some unnecessary utilization would be restrained and
costs to DOD would be reduced. The net effect on costs to DOD
though, would probably still be an increase over non-CRI areas
as a result of the open-ended availability of MTF services and
the limitations inherent in a shared-risk contract.
B. MANAGING BENEFICIARY DEMAND BEHAVIOR THROUGH INCENTIVES
The CRI project provided both positive and negative
results. On the positive side, access and satisfaction were
significantly improved and utilization of preventive services
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increased. Also, greater numbers of beneficiaries were
encouraged to enroll in the managed care Prime option, which
enabled DOD to better assess the health care needs and
utilization patterns of this population. On the negative
side, outpatient utilization and total program costs
increased. These mixed findings thus lead to concerns
regarding how to structure a health care delivery system so as
to maintain high quality and satisfaction while restraining
unnecessary demand and controlling costs.
This leads back to the central theme of this thesis, that
health care delivery systems should be structured to include
incentives to motivate patients to be more cost-conscious in
their demand for health care services. Potential changes to
the DOD health care delivery system should therefore address
the following topics.
1. Cost Sharing Incentives
As stated earlier, cost sharing in the form of
premiums, deductibles and copayments plays an important role
in shaping demand behavior. Of these cost sharing mechanisms,
copayments are the most powerful determinant of behavior.
Within the current military health care system, cost sharing
varies substantially depending on whether the care is
delivered by the MTF or CHAMPUS, or within the scope of one of
DOD's many demonstration projects.
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In the MTF, outpatient services are delivered free of
charge and inpatient services are provided free or for a
minimal per diem rate depending on beneficiary category.
These minimal cost sharing features have failed to restrain
demand in the MTF as evidenced by utilization rates which far
exceed those for the general civilian population.
Standard CHAMPUS operates as a traditional fee-for-
service indemnity program, see Appendix A. After a small
deductible has been satisfied, coinsurance rates of 20% or 25%
apply depending on beneficiary category. Copayments at the
time of service are not required, and beneficiaries do not pay
a premium for the plan. As in other fee-for-service plans,
utilization is largely guided by patient demand. And, as in
the MTF, DOD has been unable co restrain demand to the
detriment of cost control efforts.
Cost sharing provisions in DOD's demonstration
projects vary substantially by type, location, enrollment
requirements and ability to use MTF services. The CRI Prime
option and the Uniformed Services Family Health Plan (USFHP)
scheduled to begin in October 1993 provide substantially
reduced cost sharing in exchange for mandatory enrollment and
participation in a managed care network program. Cost sharing
occurs primarily through copayments at the time of service.
These plans differ in that USFHP enrolles will be prohibited
from using non-emergent MTF services. The plans also differ
in the amount of the physician services copayment required.
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In the USFHP and California, Hawaii and New Orleans CRI Prime
programs, the copayment is currently set at $5 per visit. In
the CRI Prime program in Texas and Louisiana, an enrollment
fee and higher copayments of $10 per physician visit are
required [Ref. 5:p. 26].
In DOD's other demonstration projects, cost sharing to
beneficiaries occurs in essentially the same form as for non-
demonstration sites -- free or minimal cost for direct care
services provided by the MTF or its network extensions, and
deductibles and coinsurance rates for care delivered by the
indirect system. Even though these other demonstrations have
not yet been evaluated, early evidence indicates higher levels
of demand and utilization and marginal success in cost
control.
Therefore, the results of the California and Hawaii
CRI experience and preliminary findings from DOD's other
demonstration projects indicate that DOD could make greater
use of cost sharing incentives to modify beneficiary demand
behavior and control cost escalation. Consideration could be
given to increasing copayments for care delivered outside the
MTF, implementing copayments within the MTF for care provided
to beneficiaries, and establishing health care premiums
overall.
DOD should also consider imposing different levels of
cost sharing to achieve its objectives of managing
utilization, restraining demand and controlling costs. If
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health insurance premiums were established, higher premiums
should be charged for those plans, such as fee-for-service
reimbursement, that generate higher costs to DOD. Levels of
copayments could vary (e.g., free, $5, $10 or $15) by the type
of care to be delivered. For example, in order to encourage
the use of preventive services, copayments for these services
could be waived or reduced from the level charged for standard
physician visits. These changes would create incentives for
beneficiaries to seek care from sources that would lower their
personal costs and the costs to DOD, especially in the long-
term.
2. Choice Among Health Plans
In the present MHSS structure, beneficiaries may
choose to receive their care from the MTF and its network
extensions or from civilian providers operating under CHAMPUS.
In many cases, decisions regarding the source of care are made
irrespective of cost, since the beneficiaries themselves do
not bear the full cost of their choices.
As discussed in Chapter II, most people use an
expected utility approach in evaluating the options available
to them. In the MHSS, patients make choices in a confusing
system comprised of:
* Limited and variable MTF access for some beneficiary
categories and services,
e Nonstandardized and undefined benefit structures within
the MTF,
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"* Freedom to seek care from either the CHAMPUS system or the
MTF and,
" Freedom to seek an unlimited quantity of CHAMPUS health
care services, subject only to the CHAMPUS defined benefit
and fee-for-service reimbursement structures.
To enable economical choice, beneficiaries should be
given information regarding the costs and benefits of plan
options and fully bear the costs and benefits of their
choices. This presupposes that the MHSS has defined plan
options and benefit structures and costs, and guarantees the
availability of these benefits. As described above, the
options should provide incentives for beneficiaries to select
plans which enable DOD to better control costs, in both the
short and long-term. Beneficiaries selecting "high option"
plans, those plans that would increase costs to DOD, should
bear the increased costs associated with their choice.
The objectives of the Coordinated Care Program,
establishing a uniform benefit structure, similar cost sharing
requirements within beneficiary category, and maximum choice,
would enable beneficiaries to make informed, economical
choices.
In a 1984 survey of beneficiaries, three out of four
respondents stated that they would be willing to pay $5 for
each outpatient visit to an MTF in exchange for added CHAMPUS
benefits. Also, 47% of married officers and 36% of married
enlisted personnel expressed a willingness to join an HMO as
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an alternative to CHAMPUS [Ref. 18:p. 34]. These results
indicate that beneficiaries, when offered choices among
competing alternatives, are willing to make tradeoffs between
costs and benefits. Results from the CRI Prime option also
demonstrated that beneficiaries were willing to participate in
a managed care program in exchange for lower cost sharing and
increased preventive care benefits. The results from the 1992
DOD Health Care Survey will provide an updated perspective on
current beneficiary attitudes concerning costs and benefits of
health care services.
In a 1984 study of the feasibility of implementing a
Health Enrollment System (HES) for the MHSS, researchers
concluded that with a managed care enrollment program, DOD's
costs could substantially be reduced without adverse effects
on the health status of individuals involved [Ref. 45:p. 8].
However, the authors also concluded that significant changes
in the organizational structure, resource management controls
and data management systems would have to be made before an
HES could be effectively implemented.
The HES model achieved cost control through the use of
utilization management and beneficiary copayments. In order
to offset the financial consequences of copayments, the
authors suggested implementation of a health allowance and
catastrophic protection for enrollees [Ref. 45:p. 53].
The health allowance would be similar to current
allowances for housing and subsistence. Housing and
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subsistence allowances are now provided to active duty members
to offset these costs which may vary by location and which are
not considered to be part of the basic compensation package.
The health allowance, would thus compensate beneficiaries for
incurring additional costs for health care services, while
retaining the effectiveness of the copayment incentives.
3. Individual Responsibility and Involvement
In both sections above, individual responsibility and
involvement in health care decision making are emphasized.
DOD's comprehensive restructuring of the health care system
must therefore include incentives for beneficiaries to make
efficient choices to enhance DOD's cost control efforts.
Further, the revised structure should be designed to aid
beneficiaries in making informed choices among equitable and
reasonable alternatives. "Somehow, someway, we must get
individuals into the decision making process that determines
if they need care and where to find the best cost care." [Ref.
46:p. 86]
Studies have shown that consumer's involvement in
health care decision making is significantly correlated with
level of satisfaction and functional outcome [Ref. 47:p.
1223]. Not surprisingly, these studies show that overall
costs are also reduced since involved consumers are more
likely to: engage in healthy behaviors, initiate effective
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home health care remedies and practices, and seek medical
intervention earlier in the disease process.
Therefore, we must move beyond a passive entitlement
philosophy to one in which the beneficiary is an active
participant. A restructured health care system which utilizes
incentives and emphasizes beneficiary involvement and choice
will benefit both DOD and its beneficiaries through proper use
of health care services at reasonable cost.
C. DOD HEALTH CARE REFORM
As indicated in the studies in Chapter II, and as
experienced in the CRI demonstration project, incentives play
a powerful role in shaping the behavior of individuals. The
challenge for DOD is to redesign its health care delivery
system so that beneficiaries have the incentive to efficiently
and economically utilize the system. The following sections
describe specific changes that should be implemented to
enhance awareness of cost and improve beneficiary involvement
in health care decisions.
1. Achieving Equity in Benefit Structures
There are many inequities in the current MHSS benefit
structure. Although the CHAMPUS benefit structure is well
defined, benefit structures in the MTF's vary considerably by
location and type of facility. Historically, MTF's have
limited access to certain services as a result of pressures to
balance their budgets and meet caseload mix requirements for
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operational readiness. Furthermore, benefits available within
the MTF's may be unobtainable by beneficiaries due to the time
cost considerations of receiving care and administrative
conditions (e.g., backlogged appointment systems) which
effectively serve to ration, or limit access to, health care
services.
Therefore, to achieve equity, benefit structures for
both CHAMPUS and the MTF should be equalized. Benefits not
available within the MTF, due to lack of service capability or
projected need in excess of capacity or operational readiness,
should be provided as part of a network plan. Once guaranteed
access to a comparable set of benefits, beneficiaries could
then make more informed comparisons of costs and benefits. By
providing enhanced financial incentives for those plan options
which benefit DOD, beneficiaries could be steered towards more
cost-effective health care choices.
2. Incentivizing Economical Choices and Behaviors
A restructured MHSS should provide positive financial
incentives for beneficiaries to seek care from managed care or
network plans. Beneficiaries choosing fee-for-service health
care with relatively unlimited provider choice, however,
should face higher cost sharing amounts since these plans
generate higher costs for DOD.
It's time to "...pose the policy issue bluntly: higher
costs or fewer choices". [Ref. 48:p. 550] MHSS beneficiaries
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currently have one of the most comprehensive health plans
available in this country. As the nation and DOD reshape
their health care policies to deal with increasing costs,
choice among providers and standard fee-for-service
reimbursement is likely to become more limited and more
costly. Thus, this change would be politically feasible to
implement since it would mirror reforms suggested for the
civilian sector.
DOD should also structure the system to incentivize
healthy behaviors and preventive care. This could be
accomplished by waiving or limiting cost sharing requirements
for preventive services, and enhancing preventive care
education and health service benefits. If a health allowance
was implemented to offset cost sharing requirements, such as
that proposed in the HES study, the allowance could be set to
reward behaviors such as regular exercising or not smoking.
3. Mandated Enrollment
Once DOD has established equitable options in terms of
costs and benefits among its health care plans, beneficiaries
should be required to choose one of these plans. Mandatory
enrollment would ensure beneficiaries guaranteed access to a
defined set of benefits at predetermined cost sharing levels.
Mandatory enrollment would also provide DOD with much needed
information for planning, forecasting demand and capitation
budgeting, and would thus enhance cost control efforts.
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Mandated enrollment would also help DOD monitor the
occurrence or impact of any "ghost population" migration. The
"ghost population" represents those individuals who are
eligible for MHSS health benefits, but do not currently use
the system. The largest part of the ghost population is
comprised of retired families who hold private insurance for
their medical care. If the national health care reform effort
results in a standardized package of benefits that is inferior
to the military benefit, it is likely that these ghost
beneficiaries would increase their participation in the MHSS.
Mandated enrollment would be the most effective means for
monitoring and managing this trend.
Enrollment could be implemented using an open-season
methodology as now occurs in the FEHBP7 for federal civil
service workers. In this methodology, selections and changes
in health plans are made once a year during a defined period.
Exceptions for more frequent changes in health plan coverage
could be made in cases of persons diagnosed with a major
illness, family hardships, or for personnel below a specific
paygrade.
4. System-wide Reforms
In order for DOD to define a standard health benefit
package, guarantee access to a defined set of health care
services, generate and more fully participate in health care
7Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan
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networks, and implement a system of health plan choice through
mandatory enrollment, vast structural reforms are needed. In
a concept paper prepared for the Navy Surgeon General, BUMED8
planners and administrators cited several barriers to
implementing these reforms. Among them were administrative
constraints associated with personnel administration,
procedural regulations, and the budget and funding processes
[Ref. 49:p. 3]. Thus, if DOD were to provide a health plan
competitive with those offered in the civilian sector, a
significant reduction in bureaucratic regulations would be
necessary to "level the playing field".
The most important problem, however, was the inability
of current MHSS information management systems to support
these reforms. As described in several Congressional reviews
of the DOD health care system and reform efforts, this problem
is a potential "show stopper". Effective implementation of
managed care principles requires that patient and provider-
specific data be captured for each episode of care. Existing
MHSS information systems do not provide for analysis and
utilization review of this level of data, and thus they must
be improved. Improvement of these information systems will no
doubt be very costly, but essential.
In summary, the MHSS must make significant
administrative and system changes in order to implement the
"Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
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health care reform measures described above. In response to
national health care reform changes and increasing budgetary
pressures to control cost growth, these system-wide changes
can not be considered optional. In fact, they will be
necessary for the MHSS to survive as a health care delivery
system in the 1990's and beyond.
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C•APTUR V. CONCLUSIONS AND RZCOIKZNDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
DOD gained valuable insights regarding the impact of
financial incentives on military beneficiary demand behavior
as a result of the CRI demonstration project. The CRI project
also provided DOD with insights regarding its ability to
control cost growth in a contractor-operated managed care
program.
As the demonstration proved, beneficiary demand is highly
responsive to cost sharing changes. It also showed that
beneficiaries were more likely to seek preventive health care
services when these were included in the benefit package at
modest cost sharing amounts. This increased use of preventive
health care services is cost beneficial to DOD in the long-
term and should thus be encouraged.
The CRI project also showed that a shared-risk, open-ended
contract limited DOD's ability to manage utilization and
contain costs. Since DOD shared the risk with the contractor,
the contractor was not fully responsible for the costs of
providing all health care services to participating
beneficiaries. In 1988, a shared-risk contract was considered
appropriate due to the newness of the contracting effort, the
size of the contract, and the limited number of bidders. In
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the future though, DOD should negotiate fully at-risk,
capitated managed care contracts in order to better control
its health care costs.
The open-ended feature of the contract allowed
beneficiaries to use both contractor and MTF services at their
discretion. Since MTF services are provided free or at minimal
cost, beneficiaries were incentivized to make maximum use of
care from both sources. As a result, overall utilization
increased, and total costs to DOD from the CRI project were
greater than those experienced in the control area.
Therefore, the lessons DOD learned from this experience
could be summarized as follows:
"* Financial incentives have a great impact on demand
behavior,
"* The $5 copayment employed in the CRI project was
insufficient to restrain unnecessary demand,
"* Incentives, in the form of lower cost sharing and added
health benefits, can be used to encourage the utilization
of preventive health services,
"* Allowing beneficiaries unimpeded access to both contractor
and MTF sources of care increased overall utilization and
thus costs,
"* Utilization review efforts by themselves in a managed care
environment are not sufficient to offset cost increases
from vastly increased demand, and
"* Beneficiaries will voluntarily participate in a managed
care program if provided incentives such as lower cost
sharing and additional health benefits.
67
These important lessons should be applied to DOD's reform
of the military health care system. In the past, DOD
primarily focused on controlling costs through provider
incentives. The CRI experience, however, indicates that
beneficiaries, rather than being passive recipients, play a
key role in cost control and the health care delivery process.
Therefore, factors affecting the cost-consciousness and demand
behavior of beneficiaries must be addressed in any system
reform efforts. Strategies, such as the use of incentives,
which serve to increase beneficiary involvement and cost
awareness will thus be critical to the success of DOD health
care reform.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Suggestions for Future Research
Beginning in late 1993, additional data will become
available from DOD's other managed care demonstration
programs, namely the Catchment Area Management (CAM), TRICARE,
and Gateway to Care (GTC) projects. Each of these programs
varied in their approach to implementing managed care. The
CAM program was implemented utilizing an enrolled population.
The GTC used a modified form of capitated budgeting based on
the total number of eligible beneficiaries residing in the
catchment area. The TRICARE program represented the first
large scale tri-service managed care delivery network.
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The data from these projects should provide valuable
insights to DOD on the effectiveness of managed care programs
and how best to implement them. The success of each of these
programs and CRI in terms of cost control and managing
beneficiary demand behavior should also be compared and
evaluated.
Analysis of the 1992 DOD Health Care Survey data, will
also provide an updated perspective on beneficiary attitudes
concerning health care benefits and costs of health care
services. The results of the survey could be used to predict
the acceptance and effectiveness of any potential changes in
the cost sharing and benefit structures that may result from
DOD's health care reform efforts.
2. DOD Health Care Reform
In the past, attempts or even suggestions to reform
the military health care system were met with strong political
opposition. Beneficiaries loudly voiced their concerns
regarding "erosion of benefits" and politicians were reluctant
to alter an established entitlement. Although opposition to
reform in the military medical system should still be
anticipated, the present time is ideal for DOD to proceed with
its restructuring efforts. This is so because of the
following events:
* Health care reform discussions at the national level have
made the public aware of the problems with escalating
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health care costs and the need for change in the health
care system.
"* Policy debates regarding the unsustainability of public
commitments to entitlement spending in the face of
sluggish economic growth, the public's general resistance
to tax increases,and the growing federal debt.
"* Promotion of national health care reform emphasizing
"shared sacrifice" in which highly insured individuals
would surrender some of their "excess" coverage for the
benefit of the uninsured. Compared to the general public,
military beneficiaries are considered to have extensive
health plan coverage.
"* The likely development of a national health care policy
which would place more emphasis on managed care and
individual involvement and responsibility in health care
decision making.
"* The current administration's commitment to downsizing DOD.
As this occurs, comparatively less emphasis is placed on
the military health benefit as a means of recruitment and
retention.
As a result of these changes in the political
landscape, acceptance of the sweeping reforms necessary to
restructure the military health care system is more likely.
These sweeping reforms will involve restructuring the health
care delivery system so that beneficiaries are more cost-
conscious in making their health care decisions. Incentives
which support this cost-conscious behavior include cost
sharing and choice among economical health plan alternatives.
Also, beneficiaries will be more apt to make informed cost-
conscious decisions when they are active participants in the
health care delivery process.
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Therefore, it is imperative that DOD's reform plan, a
potential product of the underway Section 733 review9, be
balanced. Structural changes which enhance the military
benefit, such as a guaranteed, defined benefit package,
improved access and choice, and lower cost sharing, must be
balanced against those changes requiring cost-conscious
behavior on the part of the beneficiary.
If key features of the reform proposal designed to
enhance beneficiary cost-consciousness were not accepted and
dismissed as politically unpalatable, DOD would risk
increasing its overall costs as initially occurred in the CRI
demonstration project. Past experience within DOD and current
demonstration projects indicate that cost control can not be
achieved without beneficiary awareness of costs and active
participation in the health care delivery process.
Finally, as a result of the discussions of national
health care reform and the changing political landscape, DOD
has a unique and very important responsibility to
substantially reform its health care system. Care should be
taken to effectively redesign the system so that the military
health benefit for active forces, veterans and their families
is preserved. Failure to do so could result in the military
health care system being assimilated into a national health
91n Section 733 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Congress required DOD to submit a plan
for reform of the military health care system.
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care plan providing lesser benefits, much to the detriment of
those who have served their country proudly.
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APPENDIX A
Summary of Benefits and Coverage for CRI Options
Standard CIANPUS CHANPUS Prins CRAXPUS
______________- -Extra
Annual Junior enlisted: None Same as








Active duty 20% CHAMPUS $5 per visit 15% plan
dependents allowable allowable





Active duty 20% CHAMPUS $10 individual 15% plan
dependents allowable and $5 group allowable
visit.
Retired and 25% CHAMPUS $10 individual 20% plan
dependents allowable and $5 group allowable
visit.
Preventive None except well Routine Same as
services baby care and physical standard







Active duty Greater of $25 Same as Same as
dependents per admission or standard standard
MTF inpatient
per diem charges
Retired and Lesser of $75/day to Lesser of
dependents $210/day or 25% $750 maximum $125/day or




summary of Benefits and Coverage for CRI Options
(Continued)




Active duty 20% CHAMPUS $4 copay up 15% plan
dependents allowable to 30-day allowable
supply
----------------------------------------------------------
Retired and 25% plan $5 copay up 20% plan
dependents allowable to 30-day allowable
supply
Providers Free to use any Must use Must use







Paperwork Beneficiary No No
required files own claim beneficiary beneficiary
claims filing claims
filing
NOTE: Prime copayments for primary care and preventive
services are not required for dependents of active duty
members with pay grades E-4 and below.
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